Bank of America in the Cross Hairs

Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard announced that on December 17, 2010, his Office filed a lawsuit against Bank of America and its affiliated companies  alleging violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act and violations of the consent judgment entered in March 2009 between Arizona and the Countrywide companies owned by Bank of America.

The lawsuit, filed in Maricopa County Superior Court, was triggered by hundreds of consumer complaints and follows a year-long investigation into Bank of America’s residential mortgage servicing practices, particularly its loan modification and foreclosure practices.

Goddard stated that Bank of America, the nation’s largest residential mortgage loan servicer, should be leading the way out of the country’s foreclosure crisis. Instead, he said, “Bank of America has been the slowest of all the servicers to ramp up loss mitigation efforts in response to the housing crisis. It has shown callous disregard for the devastating effects its servicing practices have had on individual borrowers and on the economy as a whole.”

The complaint asks the court to hold the defendants in contempt for violating the consent judgment and to order them to pay restitution to eligible consumers and civil penalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs of investigation to the State. It further asks the court to order the defendants to pay up to $25,000 for each violation of the consent judgment and up to $10,000 for each violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act.

Goddard noted that Arizona has been particularly hard hit by the foreclosure crisis, as evidenced by recent reports ranking the state second behind Nevada in foreclosures. Nevada plans to file a similar lawsuit against Bank of America today.

The consent judgment was entered into on March 13, 2009 to resolve the Attorney General’s allegations that Countrywide had engaged in widespread consumer fraud in originating and marketing mortgage loans. In the judgment, Countrywide agreed to develop and implement a loan modification program for certain former Countrywide borrowers in Arizona. Bank of America acquired Countrywide on July 1, 2008 and has assumed responsibility for Countrywide’s compliance with the consent judgment.

The complaint filed today alleges that, since the consent judgment was entered, Bank of America has repeatedly violated the judgment’s provisions related to loan modifications. Instead of providing the relief to which eligible homeowners were entitled, Bank of America has failed to make timely decisions on modification requests and proceeded with foreclosures while modification requests were pending in violation of the agreement.

The complaint also alleges that Bank of America has violated the Consumer Fraud Act by misleading Arizona consumers about its loss mitigation process and programs, including matters such as:
• Whether homeowners must be delinquent on their mortgage payments to be considered for a loan modification.
• How much time it would take to receive a decision from Bank of America on a modification request or a short sale request.
• Whether foreclosure would proceed while a modification or short sale request was pending, or while a homeowner was making trial payments.
• Whether the homeowner had been approved for a loan modification.
• Failure to provide valid reasons why the homeowner was declined for a modification.
• Whether the homeowner would be approved for a permanent modification if the consumer successfully made all trial modification payments.

As a result of Bank of America’s deceptive practices, many homeowners who were already contending with other financial hardships have been led to unnecessarily deplete their dwindling savings in futile attempts to obtain the promised relief and save their homes. Many homeowners who tried to obtain a modification from Bank of America ended up owing more principal on their loans or having less equity (becoming more “underwater”) in their homes. Others gave up their chances to pursue other financial options, such as short sales, while trying to modify their loans with Bank of America. These consumers endured months of frustrating delays, not knowing whether or when they would lose their homes. They called Bank of America and resubmitted their paperwork over and over again in futile efforts to get the help they were promised.

“I am filing this lawsuit today because, after years of delay and broken promises, Arizonans should not have to wait any longer to seek redress,” Goddard stated. “Our homeowners and communities need and deserve relief. Bank of America must be held accountable for its deceptive conduct and failed commitments.”

For anyone in the front lines of the foreclosure debacle, this should come as little surprise.  The Attorney's General's lawsuit joins many across the country seeking class-action status, alleging that Bank of America regularly falsely informs borrowers that it did not receive requested information and demands that documents be re-sent.  Bank of America is not exactly alone here.  The entire loan modification "extend and pretend" system is flawed and implicitly intended to allow servicers of loans the opportunity to make more money while stringing people along with the false hope that they will receive a permanant loan modification.

The Walk Away

University of Arizona College of Law Professor Brent T. White has stirred quite a bit of controversy over his recent article in the Arizona Legal Studies entitled "Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis."  

His basic thesis is that despite the increasing number of homeowners walking away from their underwater mortgages, most homeowners continue to try and hold on to their homes even when it does not make economic sense to do so.  He suggests that homeowners choose to try and hold on to their homes to avoid the shame and guilt of foreclosure and because of the  "exaggerated anxiety" over the perceived consequences of a foreclosure created by "social control agents."  In short, he believes that underwater homeowners (in Arizona and California) are not knowingly making bad choices, they just can not "cognitively grasp" that they would be better off financially by simply walking away.  At the end of the day, argues White, many more underwater homeowners should be walking away from their mortgage obligations. 

As a justification for his thesis, White suggests that the "norms governing homeowner behavior stand in sharp contrast to norms governing lenders, who seek to maximize profits or minimize losses irrespective of concerns of morality or social responsibility. This norm asymmetry leads to distributional inequalities in which individual homeowners shoulder a disproportionate burden from the housing collapse."  

White argues that there are costs associated with walking away, but they are not outweighed by the financial benefits of a "strategic default."  While White's thesis is controversial, as it applies to Arizona borrowers, he is correct.  Arizona's anti-deficiency laws are incredibly broad and protect the large majority of borrowers who are now trying to keep pace with a subdivision home that is severely underwater.  Arizona's anti-deficiency statute (A.R.S. Section 33-814(G)) prevents lenders from pursuing a deficiency (the difference between the amount owed by the borrower and the price bid at a trustee's sale) against the borrower.  While a borrower's credit rating will undoubtedly take a severe beating from a foreclosure and the borrower may have to wait several years to obtain a federally guaranteed loan, for many underwater borrowers, the calculus leads to the undeniable conclusion that walking away makes the most financial sense. 

As for the moral aspect of walking away, White reasons that the overriding message to borrowers is that they have a moral responsibility to pay off their obligation.  White counters this message by pointing out that lenders are operating amorally according to market norms and could have acted to protect themselves by following prudent underwriting practices.  White's final point is that  "it is time to take morals out of the picture and search for an equitable solution to the negative equity problem."  While White is correct in many respects, had lenders and borrowers employed a stronger sense of morals when it came to underwriting and borrowing, we might not have experienced such a severe market bubble and attendant bust. 

The Jumbo Wave

It seems that the small glimmer of hope that everyone is hoping for in the housing market is not likely to come anytime soon.  Mathew Padilla has posted an excellent blog article discussing that the discussion of another wave of foreclosure implies that the current wave has already receded.  Sam Khater, a senior economist with First American CoreLogic has stated: “To say there is a second wave implies the (current) wave has receded . . . I don’t see that the wave has receded.”

Call it what you will, the next foreclosure wave to hit will largely involve Pay Option ARMs.  Pay Option ARMs are adjustable rate mortgages on which the interest rate adjusts monthly and the payment adjusts annually, with borrowers offered options on how large a payment they will make. The options include interest-only, and a "minimum" payment that is usually less than the interest-only payment. The minimum payment option results in a growing loan balance, termed "negative amortization."  As Long and Foster's Ron Sitrin recently commented: because these loans "had negative amortization for so long, they can't refinance out of them and they cannot sell them because the loans are worth more than the properties themselves."

For the most part the expensive gated communities have avoided the impact of the current foreclosure wave, but its job loss consequences are coming home to roost in the upper income brackets.  This graph puts the Pay Option ARM problem in stark terms: 

As a recent post on Dr. Housing Bubble stated: "The Pay Option ARM is one of the most poorly construed mortgage product ever to face this planet. It was a pathetic attempt to allow a larger majority of Americans to have a piece of the great American credit ponzi scheme."  How's that for upbeat? 


Arizona Foreclosure Rates

RealtyTrac just released its 2008 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report, which reported that there were a total of 3,157,806 foreclosure filings (default notices, auction sale notices, and bank repossessions) on 2,330,483 properties during 2008.  That was an 81 percent increase over 2007 and a 225 percent increase over 2006.  To get a feel for the breadth and scope of just how serious the foreclosure Juggernaut is, take a look at this map to see just how hard hit certain parts of the country were in 2008.

Arizona reported the third highest foreclosure rate of all states in 2008.  4.49 percent of all housing units in Arizona received at least one foreclosure filing during the year.  Indeed, 116,911 properties in Arizona received a foreclosure filing, which also put Arizona third for total foreclosure filings.  Amazingly, foreclosure activity in Arizona during 2008 increased 203 percent from 2007 and 665 percent from 2006.  That last percentage far surpasses the two top foreclosure activity states - California (412 percent increase since 2006) and Florida (412 percent increase since 2006).  

Not surprisingly, Pinal and Maricopa County were particularly hard hit.  The Phoenix metropolitan area reported 97,684 foreclosure filings in 2008, an increase of 220.77 percent from 2007.  That put the Phoenix metropolitan area fifth on the top 100 metropolitan areas, which is fairly consistent with its metropolitan population ranking.  The Tucson metropolitan area reported 9,043 foreclosure filings in 2008, an increase of 113.33 percent.  The Tucson metropolitan area ranked 37th on the top 100 metropolitan areas, which is again fairly close to the Tucson metropolitan population ranking. 

The burn-off of the Arizona housing bubble seems to be gaining momentum faster than the meteoric rise in real estate prices.  For example, take a look at the graph of median home prices in Phoenix between 1989 and 2009.  Look at the incredible bell curve between about 2005 and 2008.  The scary thing that some commentators are noting, is that while the bell curve has basically been erased and median prices are near 2004 levels, the current inventory of homes is far greater than 2004 levels, not to mention, it is much more difficult to qualify now.  Looks like we may not hit a bottom for a while yet.  The bubbly hangover may be more painful than the euphoria of the upswing, eh?